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Siemsen and his colleagues tested four models
of the relationships among motivation, opportu-
nity, and ability: (a) a linear combination, (b) the
constraining factor model, (c) a traditional mul-
tiplicative model, and (d) a combination of the
other three. Put simply, they found that the CFM
was superior to the other models—not only in
terms of model fit, but also in terms of qualitative
insights. The idea of one factor being a bottleneck
that determines knowledge-sharing behavior seems
to hold true for both motivation and ability (i.e., if
motivation or ability is lacking, sharing behavior
doesn’t occur). The results for opportunity (opera-
tionalized as time availability) were a bit more
complex, but no less interesting. In a nutshell,
when employees lacked the time to share knowl-
edge (i.e., opportunity was the bottleneck), moti-
vation and ability were blocked from having an
impact on knowledge-sharing behavior. Put an-
other way, if time was insufficient, it made no
difference how motivated employees were to share
knowledge or how skillful they were in doing so;
they just did not engage in sharing behavior.
These results are compelling in several respects.
First, this study makes an important contribution
to the motivation literature by enhancing our
understanding of how motivation, opportunity,
and ability work in a knowledge-sharing context.
It also clarifies the ambiguous results from previ-
ous studies and extends the applicability of a con-
straining factors model beyond a traditional oper-
ations management domain.
Most important, however, is that Siemsen and
his colleagues offer us clear insights for managerial
practice. Their rigorous approach yields metrics
that can be used in the implementation of knowl-
edge-sharing initiatives. By evaluating the levels
of motivation, ability, and opportunity within an
organization, managers can better determine
where to invest time and money to enhance
knowledge-sharing activities.
Source: Siemsen, E., Roth, A.V., & Balasubramanian, S.
(2007). How motivation, opportunity, and ability drive
knowledge sharing: The constraining factor model. Journal
of Operations Management, 26, 426–445.
Improving Employee Motivation and
Retention in Call Centers: Is Adding
Layers the Answer?
ResearchBrief byNikos Bozionelos, Professor in
Organizational Behavior andHumanResource
Management,DurhamUniversity
Many scholars and managers believe that thestructure of the economy and the nature ofcompetition have fundamentally changed
since the 1980s. These changes, many also be-
lieve, have led to flattened organizational hierar-
chies and reduced job security. And as a result, so
the thinking goes, employees face dramatically
reduced opportunities for upward mobility. In
short, conventional wisdom in many cases is that
traditional career ladders have largely vanished, with
little hope of a return to the internal labor markets of
the past. That said, an alternative perspective also
exists, one suggesting that changes in job structures
within firms are neither unidirectional nor perma-
nent. Instead, job structures—and the opportunities
they present to employees—evolve as firms search
for the right balance between cost efficiency and
maintenance of product quality.
Moreover, economic changes have generated
new types of jobs. One example of a new type of
employment is the work performed by customer
service representatives in call centers. According
to some estimates, call centers account for up to
5% of total employment. Consequently, call cen-
ters provide an appropriate setting to investigate
the extent to which the traditional career has
been inexorably disappearing under the demands
of the new economy. And in their recent study,
Philip Moss of the University of Massachusetts at
Lowell, Harold Salzman of the Urban Institute,
and Chris Tilly of the University of Massachusetts
at Lowell did just that.
In a nutshell, Moss and his colleagues con-
ducted an extensive case study assessment of call
centers in the U.S. financial and retail industries
over a seven-year period. As part of their effort,
they carefully reconstructed the changes in job
structures that had evolved within these call cen-
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ters since they emerged in the early 1980s. Their
findings were quite interesting. Moss and his col-
leagues found that call centers typically started
their operations with flat hierarchies to achieve
cost minimization—one of the key ideas driving
the call center concept. Firms initially thought
that flat hierarchies would help them meet their
goals. But as it turned out, flat structures clashed
with the need to provide high-quality customer
service—something that required a motivated,
loyal, and highly skilled workforce.
As a result, job structures in many call centers
have changed over the years. Among the changes
observed include more layered hierarchies as well
as heightened skill and qualification requirements
for employees. In essence, these changes were
largely driven by demands for quality customer
service. For instance, adding supervisory layers,
along with recognition and rewards, provided ca-
reer growth opportunities to valued employees
and reduced turnover. In some cases, call centers
doubled the layers of their employee hierarchies in
just a few years.
Other call centers responded to customer ser-
vice and workforce demands for recognition and
career growth with pay increases for improve-
ments in skills and performance. However, ap-
proaches focusing solely on pay increases met with
relatively little success. Employees were more in-
terested in promotion opportunities. Promotion
brought formal recognition as well as changes in
status and responsibilities.
Moss and his colleagues also uncovered some
fascinating long-term employment patterns. Al-
though call center turnover rates were generally
high, much of that turnover was associated with
new employees who quickly realized that the na-
ture of call center work did not suit them. Sur-
prising perhaps to some was the fact that many
call centers had a substantial core of employees
with long career histories in the business.
In any case, the addition of hierarchical layers in
call centers was the major factor in creating internal
labor markets with good career growth opportunities
for employees. Interestingly, another contributing
factor was that hiring supervisors and managers from
the outside generally failed to deliver good results.
Externally hired managers simply did not adapt as
quickly to the call center environment, nor did they
possess the same degree of loyalty as their internally
promoted counterparts. Consequently, many call
centers moved over time toward policies that fo-
cused on promoting from within rather than hiring
from the outside.
Likewise, many call centers further expanded
career horizons for employees by offering opportu-
nities across functional boundaries in the firm. In
essence, able employees could be promoted to
areas outside the call center, particularly if appropri-
ate opportunities did not exist within the center
itself. As a result, valuable employees could be re-
tained within the firm. That said, this approach was
not without problems. In some cases, talented call
center employees tended to leak out into various
parts of the firm once they realized that opportuni-
ties existed in other units or functional areas.
Nevertheless, opportunities for upward mobil-
ity within the internal labor markets of call cen-
ters often were far from ample. Moreover, there
were clear cohort differences in place. In other
words, employees who had joined call centers
around the time of their opening often had more
opportunities to advance than their counterparts
who had joined later—when most supervisory and
managerial positions were already filled.
One implication of Moss, Salzman, and Tilly’s
study is the apparent persistence of certain man-
agerial conceptions in many call centers. A prime
example of this was the managerial belief that flat
organizational structures and cost minimization
approaches were the best ways to run call centers.
As a result, many centers started their operations
under those auspices—only to realize later and at
some cost that they were counterproductive in
terms of producing the employee motivation and
retention necessary to deliver quality customer
service. Nevertheless, such beliefs are apparently
so deeply entrenched that in some cases compa-
nies eventually regressed back to tactics that were
compatible with the premise of flat structures and
cost minimization. Indeed, another related finding
was the slowness of many call centers to learn
from the experience of others. Although the ex-
perience of the first call centers had made evident
that flat structures were not paying dividends,
many new call centers nevertheless started their
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operations with flat structures and only later felt
that they needed a new approach.
Naturally, Moss and his colleagues realize that
their study had limitations. For instance, they noted
that their results may not be generalizable across all
types of call centers. But Moss and his colleagues
have provided a great service in challenging the
commonly held belief that “traditional” careers do
not exist or do not pay dividends within call cen-
ters—an employment sector that epitomizes the new
economy. In fact, their results suggest that upwardly
mobile career paths do exist in call centers, particu-
larly when firms realize that by providing career
opportunities for employees, they can better meet
customer demands for quality service. In short, a
motivated, skilled, and loyal workforce usually
trumps cost-minimization schemes. And employees
especially value promotions, which provide the in-
creases in status and responsibility that pay raises
alone cannot match. Clearly, the message of Moss
and his colleagues is that managers should take these
findings into account when setting up call centers or
trying to improve their operations. And in doing so
they may also need to question their own beliefs: If
anything, the biggest hurdle to better call center
performance may be their own deeply entrenched
yet flawed beliefs about employees and work struc-
tures.
Source: Moss, P., Salzman, H., & Tilly, C. (2008). Under
construction: The continuing evolution of job structures in
call centers. Industrial Relations, 47, 173–208.
Does Government Ownership Always
Reduce Firm Values? Evidence from
Publicly Listed Companies in China
ResearchBrief byRanZhang,Assistant Professor of
Accounting,Guanghua School ofManagement,
PekingUniversity, and JamesA. Largay III, Professor
ofAccounting, LehighUniversity
China has achieved impressive economic growthsince introducing market reforms in the late1970s. Key factors in China’s economic mod-
ernization are the “corporatization” or partial pri-
vatization of state-owned enterprises and the list-
ing of some partially privatized publicly listed
companies (PLCs) on the Shanghai and Shen-
zhen stock exchanges. Even so, the state holds a
significant stake in many Chinese PLCs and is often
the majority shareholder. Because government inter-
vention often involves a “grabbing hand” that ex-
tracts rents and protects its ownership rights,
economists usually view government ownership as
detracting from corporate performance. Previous
studies suggest that weak institutional infrastruc-
ture compounds this negative effect.
However, the grabbing hand effect may be less
pronounced than previously believed. Most listed
firms in China have performed well despite the fact
that many of them are encumbered by substantial
government shareholdings. A recent fascinating
study by Lihui Tian of Peking University and Saul
Estrin of the London School of Economics exam-
ined the reason for this unexpected fact by testing
the relationship between government ownership
and firm performance in China’s near-laboratory set-
ting. They found a U-shaped relationship between
government ownership and corporate value—firms
with low government ownership do well, and, con-
trary to prior beliefs, firms with large government
shareholdings can also do well.
China’s transition to a more market-based
economy produced unprecedented reforms and
stock markets with unique characteristics. When
established in 1991, the Shanghai and Shenzhen
stock exchanges listed only state-owned compa-
nies. Around that time, most Chinese state-
owned enterprises underwent restructurings that
clarified property rights, improved corporate gov-
ernance, and encouraged efficient commercial
modes of operation. Many former state-owned en-
terprises became joint stock companies that of-
fered owners an incentive to maximize enterprise
value, but, as noted, the state retained majority
ownership in many Chinese PLCs. Unlike in
other emerging markets, the Chinese govern-
ment’s retention of very high government owner-
ship interests in PLCs provides a relatively unique
setting for exploring the relationship between
state ownership and corporate performance.
Taking advantage of this setting, Tian and
Estrin used data on Chinese listed firms between
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